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Abstract
The study focuses on a case of company X which owns an oil terminal and a depot in one of the Northern European 
countries. Company X's facilities are surrounded by the facilities of other oil companies. In case of an accident caused by 
company  X there  would  be  potential  liability  claims  for  property  damage  and  business  interruption.  Insurance  risk  
assessment is a well-developed approach for insurance of a company’s own property; it is not normally used for liability  
risks. This study suggests methodology for determination of liability insurance values. Based on the obtained results and  
calculations  of  replacement  values,  the  worst  case  scenario  for  company  X  was  chosen.  A new  methodology  was 
developed to determine liability insurance values in cases like that, including the total limit - maximum insurance value  
that can be claimed.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Accidents in oil and chemical industry might bring very large damages, both to the company where an accident happens  
and other companies if their facilities lie close to the place of the accident (hereinafter - ‘neighbour-companies’). In this  
case the company may face huge legal liability claims.
For instance, after Buncefield oil depot explosion and fire, which severely damaged Maylands business park, the owners 
of  the  depot  were  found liable  for  the  blast  (Taylor,  2009)  and  had  to  pay  damages  of  around 700 million  pounds  
(Hemeltoday, 2009).
2. AIM OF THE STUDY
This study focuses on a case of company X that owns an oil terminal located in a port in one of the Northern European 
countries. Several companies operate in the port close to each other with activities such as storage, loading and unloading  
of petroleum products and chemicals to and from ships, rail cars and road tankers. The facilities of company X are situated 
closely to the neighbour-companies. This gives concern for damage claims if there is an accident at company X’s facilities 
which brings destruction of property and business interruption to the neighbour-companies.
The study is conducted for insurance purposes. Based on the obtained results and calculations of replacement values, the  
worst-case  accident  scenario  for  the  port  was  chosen  and  recommendations  were  made  regarding  the  liability  risk. 
Consequence modelling for insurance risk assessment is a well-developed approach for insurance of a company’s own 
property. However it is not normally used for liability risks. Therefore a new methodology was developed to determine 
liability insurance values in cases like that, including the total limit - maximum insurance value that can be claimed.
3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Focusing mainly  on accidents  with the biggest  damage to property,  the literature suggests  several  types of  fires and 
explosions as the most common ones that can lead to such damage. Among them, the Vapour cloud explosion (VCE)  
occurs in a case of large release of flammable material in the atmosphere, which leads to forming a vapour cloud in the air  
that can be ignited in presence of an ignition source. In a case of VCE only a certain percentage of the substance released  
produces a burn, when an ignition source is present. Depending on where the explosion occurred, there are confined and 
unconfined VCEs.  Even a slow combustion process  generates  overpressure in  a  case of  confined VCE, and a small  
overpressure while burning, known as a flash fire, is produced in a case of unconfined VCE [Bjerketvedt et. al, 1993]. In 
order to have an extensive overpressure a sufficient amount of the vapour cloud must be within the flammable region of 
the material. A flammable region is considered to be the region of the vapour cloud that is between the point of release and 
the edge of the cloud. 
Another very common type of explosion that can be caused either by flammable or non-flammable liquids is the Boiling  
Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE). BLEVE is an explosion that occurs due to failure of vessel that contains 
liquid at a temperature significantly above its boiling point at normal atmospheric pressure [CCPS, 1994.]. BLEVE’s  
effects are mostly determined by the conditions of the contents in the container and of its walls at the moment of the 
containers failure, mainly because BLEVEs are usually associated with release of flammable liquids from vessels as a  
result of external fire. That means that if the container with flammable liquid is heated, its metal will be heated too and it  
will lose its mechanical strength. The heat will be transferred to the liquid and liquid’s temperature will rise. Reaching the 
liquid’s boiling point vapour bubbles are formed at the active sites that occur at interface with solids, including vessels 
walls. A cloud of almost pure vapour and mist is formed due to the rapid vaporization, expansion and loss of containment. 
After the vapour is ignited it starts to burn at the surface where it’s mixed with air. The combustion propagates to the  
centre  of  the  cloud and  a fireball  is  obtained.  Accidents  of  this  type,  that  include fireballs,  are accompanied with a 
powerful heat radiation, known as heat flux.
Type of fire that can be very often found in big accidents is the pool fire. Pool fire is a turbulent diffusion fire burning  
above  a  horizontal  pool  vaporizing  flammable  material,  where  the  flammable  material  has  zero  or  very  low initial 
momentum [Cowley and Johnson, 1991]. In a case of pool fire the heat is transferred from the fire to the pool, which  
makes the rate of evaporation, fire size etc. to be influenced, or even controlled, by that feedback. Liquid fuels can burn  
either in a form of a spill or in an open storage container. The burning duration of a pool fire depends on the form of the 
fuel material as well as on the chemistry of the fuel. There are two types of pool fires, confined and unconfined.
When a gas has a higher specific weight than the surrounding ambient air, it’s known as dense gas [Britter and Griffiths,  
1982]. Since most of the flammable gases are denser than air, flammable dense gas cloud remains in the lower part of the  
atmosphere, largely spreads in lateral direction and do not disperse as fast as a light gas. Within the refinery industry many  
products are vapours under atmospheric pressure and therefore are stored, or transported as liquids, maintained in that  
phase  at,  or  near,  the  saturation  temperature  at  atmospheric  pressure  by  refrigeration  and  insulation,  or  at  ambient  
temperature by pressurization [Yellow Book, ch. 4.11]. For a risk assessment purposes three primary ways of release can 
be considered: rapid, continuous and combined.         
All of these fires and explosions were included in the 6 scenarios that were selected for modelling. For the modelling aim 
it was used software called EFFECTS, based on the “Yellow Book” and “Green Book”. The “Yellow Book” provides 
information about consequence analysis while the “Green Book” describes the relationship between physical phenomena  
and the resulting damage. For the modelling in this study it was used the latest version of the software, EFFECTS 8,  
suitable for  handling large variety of chemicals  due to the  database containing toxic,  flammable and thermodynamic  
properties, and because it offers calculation models for accidents with storage and transportation of chemicals [TNO, 2011.  
EFFECTS].
Since all of the fires and explosions mentioned above lead to hazardous events, in order to identify the consequences of 
them, Event Tree Analysis (ETA), a technique for risk assessment was used. This technique provides possibility to predict  
potential accident scenarios in a case of hazardous event, known as initiating event. ETA is an inductive technique because 
it examines all possible responses that can be cause from the initiating event.   
4.METHODOLOGY
The study was completed in following phases:
Selection of the scenarios to model. Company X’s safety report as well as the results of the literature review and interviews  
with  Company  X’s  staff  and  local  Environmental  Protection  Office  were  discussed  and  analyzed.  'What-if'  analysis,  
generic  event  tree  analysis  (ETA) and  brainstorming techniques  were  used  to  select  the  final  list  of  6  scenarios  for 
modelling. Event tree analysis was used to determine the chain of events leading to the accident.
Modelling of potential accidents at company X’s facilities facilities in the port. The scenarios from the final list were 
modelled  using  software  developed  by  the  Netherlands  Organisation  for  Applied  Scientific  Research  (TNO),  called 
EFFECTS 8.1. Methods of calculation of physical effects (‘Yellow Book’) and EFFECTS manual were used to calculate  
necessary input values. Some additional manual calculations were performed.
Assessment  of  potential  liability  claims  from the  neighbour-companies  and  review of  available  mitigation  strategies  
Calculation of  replacement values for neighbour-companies’ tanks,  structures etc.  was conducted using the data from 
Company X’s Insurance Valuation done by the insurance broker and Summary of property values provided by one of the  
neighbour-companies.
5. MODELLING
The final list of scenarios was modelled using a software developed by the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific  
Research (TNO), called EFFECTS 8.1. Methods of calculation of physical effects (‘Yellow Book’) and EFFECTS manual  
were used to calculate necessary input values as follows.
Explosion damage contours:
- Total destruction (> 83 kPa)
- Heavy damage (35 - 83 kPa)
- Moderate damage (17 - 35 kPa)
- Minor damage (3.5 - 17 kPa)
The damage is thus dependent upon the overpressure. (TNO Built Environment & Geosciences, 2010)
Table 1 – Thermal radiation damage contours (Dreher, 1999).






Heat radiation levels are also taken from Dreher, 1999:
Table 2 – Thermal radiation effects
Heat flux Observed effect
35-37,5 kW/m2
Sufficient to cause damage to 
process equipment. Cellulosic 
material will pilot ignite within one 
minute’s exposure.
23-25 kW/m2
Spontaneous ignition of wood after 
long exposure. Unprotected steel 
will reach thermal stress 
temperatures which can cause 
failures. Pressure vessel needs to be 
relieved or failure will occur.
12,6 kW/m2
Thin steel with insulation on the 
side away from the fire may reach a 
thermal stress level high enough to 
cause structural failure. Minimum 
energy required for piloted ignition 
of wood, melting of plastic tubing.
These values have been translated into damage to structure in accordance to Table 1.
Damage to structures (empirical) at Xd is the damage suffered by a structure if it was situated at the point of study (TNO 
Built Environment & Geosciences, 2010; Empirical damage to structures).
19 different situations can be found:
The supporting structure of a round storage tank has collapsed (100 kPa)
Brickstone walls (20-30 cm) have collapsed (50 kPa)
Displacement of a cylindrical storage tank, failure of connecting pipes (50-100 kPa)
Loaded train carriages turned over (50 kPa)
Collapse of a pipe-bridge (40-55 kPa)
Displacement of a pipe-bridge, rupture of piping (35-40 kPa)
Damage to a fractioning column (35-80 kPa)
Plating of cars and trucks pressed inwards (35 kPa)
Breakage of wooden telephone poles (35 kPa)
Cladding of light industry building ripped-off (30 kPa)
Collapse of steel frames and displacement of foundation (20 kPa)
Industrial steel self-framing structure collapsed (20-30 kPa)
Cracking in empty oil-storage tanks (20-30 kPa)
Slight deformation of a pipe-bridge (20-30 kPa)
Large trees have fallen down (20-40 kPa)
Walls made of concrete blocks have collapsed (15-20)
Minor damage to steel frames (8-10 kPa)
Connections between steel or aluminium ondulated plates have failed 7-14 kPa)
The roof of a storage tank has collapsed (7 kPa)
6. RESULTS
6 serious scenarios were identified as follows:
Scenario 1, ’Buncefield-type’ scenario (see above). Tank with gasoline overfills for 15 minutes, while pump flow is 800 
m3/h. It is assumed that 10% of leaked mass turns into vapour, as reported during Buncefield accident (Buncefield Major  
Incident Investigation Board, 2008).
Scenario 2, BLEVE at LPG storage. Pipe rupture during transfer of LPG to the tank may cause leak of propane, propane  
ignites and heats the other tank. This eventually triggers BLEVE.
Scenario 3, Leak from a hole in gasoline tank. In this scenario tank starts to leak, the leak is assumed to be detected in 15  
min. Estimated fraction of product to turn into vapour is 10%, similar to Buncefield accident (Buncefield Major Incident  
Investigation Board, 2008).
Scenario 4, Dense gas explosion due to the leak of LPG tank. In this scenario propane is assumed to leak from the bottom  
of the tank which leads to explosion.
Scenario 5, Rupture of propane vessel. In this scenario it is assumed that propane vessel ruptures from metal fatigue of  
flanges.
Scenario 6, Diesel pool fire
The  selected  scenarios  were  modelled  in  EFFECTS  8.1  with  a  custom-made  selection  of  input  parameters.  Since 
EFFECTS 8.1 does not have an option for calculating replacement costs, in order to determine the worst-case scenario, 
manual calculations were conducted. Having in disposal the replacement values for groups of tanks of company X, the  
replacement costs for neighbour companies’ facilities were calculated as following.
The replacement value for one tank was calculated by dividing that value to the number of tanks in the group. Because of 
the fact  that  each tank has different volume, the replacement value per  unit of volume was obtained by dividing the  
replacement value per tank by the volume of the tank. Since company X has tanks with different types of roofs, after  
calculating the replacement values per unit of volume for all the tanks, the average value was calculated for the tanks with  
the same type of roof and that value was considered to be the replacement value per unit of volume for that type of tank.  
The procedure was repeated for the other tanks with same type of roof. At the end, from all the values that were obtained  
the average value was calculated used as a replacement value per unit of volume. That replacement value multiplied with  
the volume of the tanks that were destroyed gave the replacement value for those tanks.
Having information about the contents of neighbour companies’ tanks, the replacements values of the products inside of 
the tanks and a replacement values for clearance of debris and fire fighting were also included in the calculations.
The secondary damage was also considered, which means that the possibility of an escalation, spreading of fire etc. that  
increases the risk other tanks which are about 1 diameter away from the last tank that is damaged to be affected, was  
considered. As a result of all those calculations, the worst-case scenario was obtained.
The results of the study showed that Scenario 1 could be considered a worst-case in terms of liability risk.  (See Table 1).
It should be noted that risk of damage to the environment and people is very important but in this study the scope was 
limited to the damage to property of the neighbour-companies.
Figure 1 – Worst-case scenario on terms of liability risk.
7. CONCLUSION
Methodology to determine the liability risk was developed and tested using EFFECTS 8.1.
The suggested methodology includes the study of previous accidents, ’what-if’ analysis, event tree analysis, modelling of 
the most probable scenarios in  EFFECTS 8.1 and manual  consideration of  domino effects.  Some parameters for  the  
modelling, like fraction of flammable cloud confined, were also calculated manually.
Using the developed methodology worst-case scenario was chosen.
It can be reasonably assumed that Scenario 1 can lead to BLEVE at LPG storage (Scenario 2). But since it is impossible  
currently to establish the replacement values of BLEVE consequences – Scenario 1 remains the worst-case in terms of 
liability risk (≈260 million Euro).
The similar methodology can be used for the assessment of liability risk in chemical and oil industries as well as to 
determine the insurance value of a company’s own property.
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